DocumentCode
2164639
Title
Equilibrium research between “winner´s curse” and seller´s earnings in uniform-price synchronization auctions
Author
Sun, Jing ; Wang, Qi ; Song, Qizhu ; Lu, Tingjie
Author_Institution
College of Economics & Management, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, China
fYear
2010
fDate
4-6 Dec. 2010
Firstpage
2055
Lastpage
2058
Abstract
The auction mechanism of spectrum has become a key point in China with the issuance of 3G licenses and the coming of 4G. The uniform-price synchronization auctions which aim to reduce the risk of “winner´s curse” is proposed in this paper. Though the signal correlation model of bidders, this paper discuss the seller´s profit equilibrium when bidders are restricted to bid only one or multiple bands. This equilibrium study which can reduce the risk of “winner´s curse” and guarantee the seller´s earnings will be a theoretical reference for spectrum auctions in China.
Keywords
Biological system modeling; Cost accounting; Economics; Europe; Licenses; Random variables; Synchronization; signal correlation; spectrum auctions; uniform-price synchronization auctions; winner´s curse;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Information Science and Engineering (ICISE), 2010 2nd International Conference on
Conference_Location
Hangzhou, China
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-7616-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICISE.2010.5691891
Filename
5691891
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