Research on Invite Bid Models of Public Projects Invested by Government Based on Principal-Agent Theory

Author

Lin-xiu, Wang ; Xie-lei

Author_Institution

Sch. of Manage., China Univ. of Min. & Technol., Xuzhou

Volume

2

fYear

2008

fDate

19-21 Dec. 2008

Firstpage

443

Lastpage

449

Abstract

In accordance with the public projects invested by government based on principal-agent under asymmetric information, analyzing the issue of choosing the authorized company, an operable model on invite-bidding was built by making use of the Deuel illegal, analytical hierarchy process and mathematics synthetic judgment method. Through the analysis of model extremes, It can provide some decided references for the client (the government) in deciding project consultation company.

Keywords

investment; public administration; analytical hierarchy process; asymmetric information; government investment; invite bid models; mathematics synthetic judgment method; principal-agent theory; project consultation company; public projects; Civil engineering; Electronic mail; Environmental economics; Financial management; Government; Information analysis; Information management; Innovation management; Investments; Project management; Government Investment; Mathematics synthetic Judgment Method; Project Principle-agent;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering, 2008. ICIII '08. International Conference on

Conference_Location

Taipei

Print_ISBN

978-0-7695-3435-0

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICIII.2008.266

Filename

4737682