DocumentCode
2226519
Title
Research on Moral Hazard of the Governmental Investment Construction Projects Based on the Residual Claiming Model
Author
Zhang, Tao ; Jiansheng Zhang ; Chen, Baofeng
Author_Institution
Coll. of Econ. & Manage., China Agric. Univ., Beijing, China
fYear
2009
fDate
26-28 Dec. 2009
Firstpage
4458
Lastpage
4461
Abstract
The paper studies the residual claiming model for stimulating participants of the governmental investment construction projects. Introducing the residual claiming model based will effectively avoid the "Moral Hazard" in construction projects, therefore we establish residual claiming model and analysis it.
Keywords
construction industry; government; socio-economic effects; governmental investment construction projects; moral hazard; residual claiming model; Conference management; Contracts; Costs; Educational institutions; Engineering management; Ethics; Hazards; Investments; Iron; Project management;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Information Science and Engineering (ICISE), 2009 1st International Conference on
Conference_Location
Nanjing
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-4909-5
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICISE.2009.969
Filename
5455281
Link To Document