Mechanism model of the influence on board structure from the control of single blockholder

In view of the high ownership concentration of Chinese listed companies, large shareholders tend to make use of the high voting rights at general meetings of shareholders to control the general assembly, so that they can control the composition and structure of the board of directors. Therefore, it´s inevitable to consider the phenomenon of the existence of large shareholders when studying the board structure of China´s listed companies. Basing on the large shareholders´ “tunneling” behavior, this paper constructs Mechanism model of the influence on board structure from single blockholder; the study portrays the board structural feature of China´s listed company that is under the control of single block-holder. After the model inferential reasoning, the conclusion is that: under the assumptions that there exist large shareholders in companies, if the large shareholders can influence the structure of the board members, for the purpose to invade the company´s value, the large shareholders will arrange the board members appointed by themselves as many as possible, and reduce the non-appointed board members by themselves as many as possible. Meanwhile, the stronger the control ability of the company´s large shareholders is, the clearer this trend will be.