DocumentCode
2243201
Title
Research on stability of technology innovation alliance based on the safeguard against opportunism
Author
Lan, Cui ; Long-ying, Hu
Author_Institution
Sch. of Manage., Harbin Inst. of Technol., Harbin, China
fYear
2011
fDate
13-15 Sept. 2011
Firstpage
1003
Lastpage
1008
Abstract
The contract among technology innovation alliance members is incomplete, which substantially increases the probability of members taking opportunistic behavior, resulting in great damages to the stability of the alliance. In this paper, by the method of evolutionary game theory, we divided the context of alliance into weak intellectual property protection system and strong intellectual protection system, structured a dynamic system equation of stability of technology innovation alliance based on the safeguard against opportunism, discussed its stability and concluded the significant importance of intellectual property protection to the stability of technology innovation alliance. These results may provide the theoretical basis and reference value for these enterprises which will prepare to establish or already established the alliance and seek further development.
Keywords
contracts; evolutionary computation; game theory; industrial property; innovation management; technology management; contract; dynamic system equation; evolutionary game theory; intellectual property protection system; opportunism safeguard; opportunistic behavior; technology innovation alliance members; technology innovation alliance stability; Contracts; Economics; Games; Intellectual property; Investments; Stability analysis; Technological innovation; evolutionary theory; incomplete contract; opportunism; stability; technology innovation alliance;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Rome
ISSN
2155-1847
Print_ISBN
978-1-4577-1885-4
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICMSE.2011.6070080
Filename
6070080
Link To Document