DocumentCode
2285935
Title
Research on income distribution of university-enterprise alliance based on multiagent game model
Author
Ma Ning ; Li Qiang
Author_Institution
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Beijing Forestry Univ., Beijing, China
fYear
2009
fDate
14-16 Sept. 2009
Firstpage
297
Lastpage
302
Abstract
To establish university-enterprise (UE) alliance is an important way to realize science and technology fruits transfer. In reality there are many universities and enterprises, and the cooperation relationship between universities and enterprises is very complex. Thus it is very difficult to resolve the multiparticipant game problem of UE alliance through traditional economics method. Based on agent-based computational economics (ACE) thought and method, evolvement system, which consists of many self-determination and interaction agents, simulates the cooperation relationship between UE alliance members. The multiagent game model of UE alliance is set up, in which university agents and enterprise agents are optimized following rule of evolution. Through a series of computational experimentations, conclusion is found that the stability of UE alliance will be affected by income distribution between alliance members.
Keywords
educational institutions; game theory; multi-agent systems; agent-based computational economics; evolvement system; income distribution; interaction agent; multiagent game model; multiparticipant game problem; science-technology fruit transfer; self-determination agent; university-enterprise alliance; Computational modeling; Conference management; Distributed computing; Engineering management; Environmental economics; Multiagent systems; Object oriented modeling; Power generation economics; Stability; Technology management; agent-based computational economics (ACE); game model; multiagent; university-enterprise (UE) alliance;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Management Science and Engineering, 2009. ICMSE 2009. International Conference on
Conference_Location
Moscow
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-3970-6
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-3971-3
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICMSE.2009.5317469
Filename
5317469
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