DocumentCode
2346078
Title
An Incomplete and Dynamic Game Analysis on Behavior between the Owner and Entrepreneur
Author
Zhou, Li
Author_Institution
Res. Center of the Econ. of the upper Reaches of Yangtze River, Chongqing Technol. & Bus. Univ., Chongqing, China
fYear
2011
fDate
15-19 April 2011
Firstpage
677
Lastpage
680
Abstract
To explain the reason and the condition under which the owner has the motion to pretend or expose his real type of psychological contract, a dynamic game model is constructed in this article, given that entrepreneur´s psychological contract is the common knowledge but that of the owner´s is private. The findings show that the owner is possible to reveal his real type when disguise cost is larger than half of the regained loss as conscientious entrepreneur come to his senses.
Keywords
commerce; game theory; psychology; dynamic game analysis; entrepreneur behavior; entrepreneur psychological contract; incomplete game analysis; owner behavior; Contracts; Economics; Games; Materials; Psychology; Watches; Game theory; Relational psychological contract; Transactional psychological contract;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Computational Sciences and Optimization (CSO), 2011 Fourth International Joint Conference on
Conference_Location
Yunnan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-9712-6
Electronic_ISBN
978-0-7695-4335-2
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CSO.2011.77
Filename
5957750
Link To Document