DocumentCode
2349227
Title
Degrees of untruth
Author
Miller, David
Author_Institution
Dept. of Philos., Warwick Univ., Coventry, UK
fYear
1988
fDate
0-0 1988
Firstpage
2
Lastpage
3
Abstract
The author points out that truth and falsehood are not open to supplementation by other truth values in the way that early work in many-valued logic, proposed, nor is truth amenable to gradation in the way that is suggested by the terminology of degrees of truth. He maintains that nevertheless there may be a degree of untruth: one untruth may be more or less false than another is. He discusses a variety of recent attempts to make some sense of degrees of untruth (or degrees of truth).<>
Keywords
many-valued logics; degree of untruth; degrees of truth; falsehood; many-valued logic; truth; Computer Society; Geometry; Logic; Mathematical model; Mathematics; Phase change random access memory; Publishing;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Multiple-Valued Logic, 1988., Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Symposium on
Conference_Location
Palma de Mallorca, Spain
Print_ISBN
0-8186-0859-5
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ISMVL.1988.5141
Filename
5141
Link To Document