• DocumentCode
    2453763
  • Title

    BitTorrent or BitCrunch: Evidence of a Credit Squeeze in BitTorrent?

  • Author

    Hales, David ; Rahman, Rameez ; Zhang, Boxun ; Meulpolder, Michel ; Pouwelse, Johan

  • Author_Institution
    Tribler Team, Tech. Univ. of Delft, Delft, Netherlands
  • fYear
    2009
  • fDate
    June 29 2009-July 1 2009
  • Firstpage
    99
  • Lastpage
    104
  • Abstract
    BitTorrent is a highly popular peer-to-peer file sharing protocol. Much BitTorrent activity takes place within private virtual communities called "private trackers" - a server that allows only community members to share files. Many private trackers implement "ratio enforcement" where the tracker monitors the upload and download behavior of peers. If a peer downloads substantially more than it uploads then service is terminated. Tracker policies related to credit effect the performance of the community as a whole. We identify the possibility of a "credit squeeze" in which performance is reduced due to lack of credit for some peers. We consider statistics from a popular private tracker and results from a simple model (called "BitCrunch").
  • Keywords
    peer-to-peer computing; protocols; BitCrunch; BitTorrent; credit squeeze; peer-to-peer file sharing protocol; private trackers; private virtual communities; ratio enforcement; Collaborative work; Conferences; File servers; International collaboration; Peer to peer computing; Protocols; Statistics; TV; Thin film transistors; BitTorrent; Credit Squeeze; Incentives; Sharing ratio;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Enabling Technologies: Infrastructures for Collaborative Enterprises, 2009. WETICE '09. 18th IEEE International Workshops on
  • Conference_Location
    Groningen
  • ISSN
    1524-4547
  • Print_ISBN
    978-0-7695-3683-5
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/WETICE.2009.22
  • Filename
    5159222