• DocumentCode
    2505596
  • Title

    Study on the complex mutual relation between team members, incentive structure, and market influence: A game model

  • Author

    Chaoxiao, Zhang

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Econ. & Bus. Adm., Zhongyuan Univ. of Technol., Zhengzhou
  • fYear
    2008
  • fDate
    25-27 June 2008
  • Firstpage
    6314
  • Lastpage
    6318
  • Abstract
    Enterprise system is usually regarded as a black box. In many studies, because of complexity, the mechanism of inner relation, input-output process, and environment factorspsila influence are always neglected. In this paper, a game model is made to analyze the relation between team cooperation and incentive structure. Other aspects are also analyzed in the model such as optimum incentive structure when team workers sabotage each other, sabotaging teampsilas agency cost, important role of the competition and cooperation between team workers under special conditions, team workerspsila reasonable personality structure and ability structure based on competition and cooperation, valid product organization based on team work, and product pricepsilas influence on incentive structure and. The results reveal that there exists mutual relation between team memberspsila activities and incentive structure, and that market plays an important role in incentive structure and enterprisepsilas management manner. Noncooperative workers (hawks) will work with cooperative workers (doves), but cooperative workers will not work with noncooperative workers. In team workerpsilas incentive structure, although promotion or prize is beneficial to inspiriting the workerpsilas effort level, it also results in sabotaging. If team cooperation is important, reasonable incentive structure should comprise fixed wage and piece rates wage, and it is necessary to divide team according as the workerpsilas ability level and personality characteristic. If team cooperation is not important, reasonable incentive structure should comprise fixed wage and promotion or prize, and it is not necessary to distinguish team workers with different ability levels and different personality charateristic. In order to increase a teampsilas vigor, even it is necessary to let hawkish workers and dovish workers work in one team. If product market is favorable, it is not necessary to supervise team workerspsila activities. On- - ly if product market is no favorable and supervision cost is no more than agency cost, is it worth of supervising.
  • Keywords
    game theory; incentive schemes; marketing; pricing; black box; complex mutual relation; enterprise system; game model; incentive structure; market influence; product organization; product price influence; Automation; Chaos; Cost function; Electronic mail; Environmental management; Game theory; Human resource management; Intelligent control; Personnel; Remuneration; Game Model; Incentive Structure; Personnel Management; Team;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Intelligent Control and Automation, 2008. WCICA 2008. 7th World Congress on
  • Conference_Location
    Chongqing
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-2113-8
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-2114-5
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/WCICA.2008.4594565
  • Filename
    4594565