• DocumentCode
    2510030
  • Title

    Game analysis of financial supervision in international financial crisis

  • Author

    Luo, Xin ; Zhang, Pei-ai

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Math., Jinan Univ., Guangzhou, China
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    23-25 May 2011
  • Firstpage
    46
  • Lastpage
    50
  • Abstract
    An universal and comprehensive complete information static game model between market participants and supervisors and analyze the factors that stimulate irregularities and the inhibitory effect of irregularities based on the idea of game theory. According to the game analysis, we propose some effective standards and recommendations for both participants and supervisors to resolve financial risks, including save supervision cost, improve the efficiency of financial supervision, establish incentive and restraint mechanisms for both participants and supervisors in order to make full use of the learning mechanisms and demonstration effect.
  • Keywords
    financial management; game theory; incentive schemes; risk management; demonstration effect; financial risk; financial supervision; game theory; incentive mechanism; international financial crisis; learning mechanism; restraint mechanism; Analytical models; Economics; Games; Inspection; Nash equilibrium; Security; financial supervision; game theory; mixed strategy; nash equilibrium;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Control and Decision Conference (CCDC), 2011 Chinese
  • Conference_Location
    Mianyang
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-8737-0
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CCDC.2011.5968143
  • Filename
    5968143