Price bargaining integration with dynamic Call Admission Control in wireless multiservice networks

In multiservice wireless networks, Call Admission Control (CAC) is essential to assure the quality of service requirements of the supported traffic. Call requests are usually classified into two different types: narrow-band and wide-band calls. In this paper, the probabilistic CAC scheme employed is extended through a game theoretic framework for resource allocation and price bargaining for the required resources providing efficient dynamic operation and capability enhancement. First, a competition game is used to obtain the resource allocation among service types based on their prices. The Nash equilibrium for this game provides the allocation that maximizes users utility. Second, based on obtained resource allocation, a price bargaining game is formulated to obtain the price values for revenue maximization. Third, the probabilistic CAC is optimized through the integrated pricing mechanism by providing the values of the admission probabilities according network conditions and users behavior towards prices. The performance results designate the considerable improvement achieved by the proposed integrated framework compared to traditional schemes.