DocumentCode
2592461
Title
Critically-congested Nash-Cournot equilibria in electricity networks
Author
Barquín, Julián
Author_Institution
Instituto de Investigacion Tecnologica, Univ. Pontificia Cornillas, Madrid
fYear
2006
fDate
11-15 June 2006
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
6
Abstract
Oligopolistic generators behaviour may result in equilibria characterized by critically-congested lines, that is, congested lines such that arbitrarially small generation changes cause them to be not-congested. The nature of such equilibria, under the Cournot (quantity bids) hypothesis is discussed, and an algorithm proposed to compute them. Probabilities measures arise in a natural way in the analysis and in the proposed algorithm
Keywords
oligopoly; power markets; power system economics; Oligopolistic generator; critically-congested Nash-Cournot equilibria; electricity network; probability; Character generation; Computational modeling; Economic forecasting; Electricity supply industry; Equations; Nash equilibrium; Power generation; Power system economics; Power system interconnection; Power system modeling; Interconnected power systems; Power system economics;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems, 2006. PMAPS 2006. International Conference on
Conference_Location
Stockholm
Print_ISBN
978-91-7178-585-5
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/PMAPS.2006.360332
Filename
4202344
Link To Document