DocumentCode
2596803
Title
A processor architecture defense against buffer overflow attacks
Author
McGregor, John P. ; Karig, David K. ; Shi, Zhijie ; Lee, Ruby B.
Author_Institution
Dept. of Electr. Eng., Princeton Univ., NJ, USA
fYear
2003
fDate
11-13 Aug. 2003
Firstpage
243
Lastpage
250
Abstract
Buffer overflow vulnerabilities in the memory stack continue to pose serious threats to network and computer security. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, a malicious party can strategically overwrite the return address of a procedure call, obtain control of a system, and subsequently launch more virulent attacks. Software countermeasures for such intrusions entail modifications to applications, compilers, and operating systems. Despite the availability of these defenses, many systems remain vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. We present a hardware-based solution that prevents buffer overflow attacks involving procedure return address corruption. We add a secure return address stack to the processor that provides built-in, dynamic protection against return address tampering without requiring any effort by users or application programmers. Also, the performance impact is negligible for most applications. Changes are not required of application source code, so both legacy and future software can enjoy the security benefits of this solution.
Keywords
buffer storage; computer architecture; security of data; buffer overflow attack prevention; computer security; network security; procedure call; processor architecture; secure procedure return address; Application software; Buffer overflow; Computer architecture; Computer security; Computer worms; Hardware; Internet; Operating systems; Proposals; Protection;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Information Technology: Research and Education, 2003. Proceedings. ITRE2003. International Conference on
Print_ISBN
0-7803-7724-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ITRE.2003.1270612
Filename
1270612
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