• DocumentCode
    2606494
  • Title

    Regulation mechanism research on hidden irregularity of dairy processing enterprises based on Principal-agent Theory

  • Author

    Bin, Fan ; Cui-xia, Li

  • Author_Institution
    Coll. of Econ. & Manage., Northeast Agric. Univ., Harbin, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    24-26 Nov. 2010
  • Firstpage
    1849
  • Lastpage
    1854
  • Abstract
    Frequent dairy products quality safe accidents make the government and consumers concern more about hidden irregularities in dairy supply chain. As a very important link in dairy supply chain, the behavior of dairy processing enterprise influences dairy products quality. It´s necessary for government to apply fit regulation mechanism to prevent against hidden irregularity of dairy processing enterprises. The purpose of this paper is designing effective hidden irregularity regulation mechanism of dairy processing enterprise based on the basic of Principal-agent Theory to prevent hidden irregularity. In this paper, it assumes that government is first principal, regulation department is secondary principal and enterprise is the agent, then we create and analyze hidden irregularity regulation model. Finally, the optimal regulation mechanism and relative properties are obtained. The results indicate that the impact factors of hidden irregularity of processing enterprises are award incentive, excess income, penalty amount and finding probability. Only government increases the supervision intensity and strength against inferior dairy products and provides award incentive for regulation department, regulation department will find irregularity actively and enterprise will choose regularity strategy. The paper supplies theoretical basis and practical guide to promote dairy products quality for government.
  • Keywords
    dairy products; food safety; supply chain management; award incentive; dairy processing enterprises; dairy products quality safe accidents; dairy supply chain; excess income; finding probability; hidden irregularity; optimal regulation mechanism; penalty amount; principal-agent theory; regulation mechanism research; Awards activities; Contracts; Dairy products; Games; Government; Nash equilibrium; dairy processing enterprise; hidden irregularity; principal-agent theory; regulation mechanism;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE), 2010 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Melbourne, VIC
  • ISSN
    2155-1847
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-8116-3
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICMSE.2010.5720031
  • Filename
    5720031