• DocumentCode
    2652577
  • Title

    The Third Party Governance Model Analysis in Industrial Cluster Based on Evolvement Game

  • Author

    Qin, LIU

  • Author_Institution
    Univ. of Shanghai for Sci. & Technol., Shanghai
  • fYear
    2007
  • fDate
    20-22 Aug. 2007
  • Firstpage
    1304
  • Lastpage
    1309
  • Abstract
    The industrial cluster shows it particular advantages to the world, and at the same time some members will have opportunism bargaining and competition behavior. These opportunism behaviors have affect the sustainable development of cluster. So the industrial cluster should be governed. The ways may be self-organization governance and the third party governance. The paper uses the evolvement game to study that under the third party governance the different groups with different strategies may evolve to different situation. And it also analyzes the factors affected the evolvement. The paper constructs the payment matrix and the replication dynamic equation of game under common condition and third party governance. According to the payment matrix, it gets the different evolvement stable strategy. Then the paper use numerical value simulation to examine the results. Last, it raises some governance policy measures.
  • Keywords
    game theory; organisational aspects; cluster sustainable development; competition behavior; evolvement game; industrial cluster; opportunism bargaining; payment matrix; replication dynamic equation; self-organization governance; third party governance model analysis; Conference management; Engineering management; Equations; Game theory; Information analysis; Numerical simulation; Sustainable development; Technological innovation; Technology management; Toy industry; evolvement game; evolvement stable strategy (ESS); industrial cluster;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Management Science and Engineering, 2007. ICMSE 2007. International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Harbin
  • Print_ISBN
    978-7-88358-080-5
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-7-88358-080-5
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICMSE.2007.4422025
  • Filename
    4422025