Two players non-cooperative iterative power control for spectrum sharing

To cope with limited spectrum resources, inefficient spectrum usage and overcrowded wireless communication, the Federal Communications Commission´s (FCC) has introduced a new way to manage RF resources: the interference temperature model. With this model the key point is to let unlicensed users use licensed frequencies, provided they can quantify and bound their interference toward the primary license holders. In this paper we study power control for spectrum sharing among two secondary users with interference temperature limit (ITL) at a measurement point. We model this scenario as 2-player non-cooperative game. The 2 players are selfish and rational and strive to maximize their own utility. The measurement point, upon violation of ITL, iteratively backs off a randomly selected secondary user. We identify the possible outcomes of this game and the conditions for the existence of unique/multiple Nash equilibria. We analyze the property of the Nash equilibria in our games, and compare their performances with the social optimal solution. Our simulation results demonstrate that the proposed solution can achieve a satisfactory performance in terms of the total transmitting rate of the two secondary users.