• DocumentCode
    2702484
  • Title

    Nash Equilibrium: Better Strategy for Agents Coordination

  • Author

    Yu, Lasheng ; Masabo, Emmanuel ; Mutimukwe, Chantal

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Comput. Sci., Central South Univ. (CSU), Changsha
  • fYear
    2008
  • fDate
    9-12 Dec. 2008
  • Firstpage
    795
  • Lastpage
    800
  • Abstract
    Intelligent agents operate in an environment that can be mostly not dynamic. This requires learning by trial and error in order to know better the environment and reach their goals. They also need cooperation among themselves. We use reinforcement learning and game theory techniques to discuss how intelligent agents learn and cooperate. As known, one of the properties of agents is that they are social. They must therefore be cooperative in the social environment where they are. This is possible by learning the environment facts by doing, sharing instantaneous information and learned knowledge. The cooperative agents will perform better than independent agents. What is the advantage of such cooperation? As an example, in this paper we shall especially show how cooperative trading agents can maximize their profits due to a good coordination by playing Nash equilibrium to ensure that each agent chooses the best strategy which gives a good payoff.
  • Keywords
    game theory; learning (artificial intelligence); multi-agent systems; Nash Q-learning; Nash equilibrium strategy; game theory technique; intelligent agent coordination; intelligent agent learning; multiagent system; reinforcement learning; Computer errors; Computer science; Environmental management; Game theory; Intelligent agent; Learning; Multiagent systems; Nash equilibrium; Robustness; Runtime; Game theory; Multiagent; Nash equilibrium; Reinforcement learning;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Asia-Pacific Services Computing Conference, 2008. APSCC '08. IEEE
  • Conference_Location
    Yilan
  • Print_ISBN
    978-0-7695-3473-2
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-0-7695-3473-2
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/APSCC.2008.179
  • Filename
    4780772