Study on the damping loss and the damping cost of duopoly strategy output-making damping equilibrium

The most fatal flaw of the classical Cournot oligopoly model as well as the related oligopoly output-making competition model is the supposition on the purpose of game players. It is thought that the only game goal is to make the maximum present profits. Based on this supposition, most game model structures are optimal structures. In this paper, some new suppositions of duopoly game are established, including the game goal supposition, the time-order supposition and bounded rationality and knowledge supposition. And a description game structure model which has strong universality to the realistic decision-making situations is also constructed. Based on this model, the damping equilibrium of the first decision-maker and the concepts of the damping loss and the total damping cost when the first decision-maker completely seizes the whole market have been put forward. At last, simulation examples for some important propositions and algorithms are given.