• DocumentCode
    2947135
  • Title

    The shapley value: Its use and implications on internet economics

  • Author

    Ma, Richard T B ; Lui, John C S ; Chiu, Dah-Ming ; Misra, Vishal ; Rubenstein, Dan

  • Author_Institution
    Columbia Univ., New York, NY
  • fYear
    2008
  • fDate
    23-26 Sept. 2008
  • Firstpage
    1094
  • Lastpage
    1096
  • Abstract
    The Internet is composed of thousand of autonomous Internet Service Providers (ISPs). On the one hand, they cooperate with one another to provide services for their customers; on the other hand, they compete with each other by using selfish routing and interconnecting strategies to maximize their own profits. Currently, ISPs use bilateral settlements to decide the financial compensation one ISP pays to another. However, without an appropriate settlement model, ISPs disputes might lead to disgraceful consequences. For example, Level 3 unilaterally terminated its ldquosettlement freerdquo peering relationship with Cogent on October 5, 2005. This disruption resulted in at least 15% of the Internet to be unreachable for the users who utilized either Level 3 or Cogent for Internet access. Although both companies restored peering connections several days later with a new ongoing negotiation, Level 3´s move against Cogent exhibited an escalation of the tension that necessitates a new settlement for ISPs.
  • Keywords
    Internet; economics; game theory; Internet Service Providers; Internet economics; Shapley value; cooperative game solution; financial compensation; Equations; Microprocessors; Operating systems; Routing; Web and internet services;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Communication, Control, and Computing, 2008 46th Annual Allerton Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Urbana-Champaign, IL
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-2925-7
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-2926-4
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ALLERTON.2008.4797681
  • Filename
    4797681