R&D Strategy and Cournot Competition with Labor-Managed and Profit-Maximizing Firms

Author

Luo, Jianli ; Zhong, Weijun

Author_Institution

Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Southeast Univ., Nanjing, China

fYear

2009

fDate

24-26 July 2009

Firstpage

718

Lastpage

721

Abstract

R&D strategic interaction was analyzed in two types of oligopoly: profit-maximizing firm (PMF) and labor-managed firm (LMF). By developing a two-stage game model of duopoly between PMF and LMF, we explore their production and R&D investment response curves of strategic interaction in Cournot competition. With comparative static analysis, we determined impacts of changes in their own and rivalpsilas R&D, wages, fixed costs on its optimal outputs respectively, and impacts of changes in their own and rivalpsilas R&D spillovers on optimal R&D level. Results showed there were some difference between LMF and PMF in the production and R&D investments.

Keywords

game theory; innovation management; investment; oligopoly; organisational aspects; personnel; profitability; salaries; strategic planning; Cournot competition; R&D investment; R&D strategy; labor-managed firm; oligopoly; profit-maximizing firm; two-stage game model; wages; Conference management; Cost function; Financial management; Investments; Oligopoly; Production; Remuneration; Research and development; Research and development management; Technological innovation; Cournot competition; Labor-managed Firm; Strategic Interaction; comparative static analysis;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering, 2009. BIFE '09. International Conference on

Conference_Location

Beijing

Print_ISBN

978-0-7695-3705-4

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/BIFE.2009.167

Filename

5208742