• DocumentCode
    3046525
  • Title

    Credibility and rationality of players strategies in multilevel games

  • Author

    Ho, Y.C. ; Tolwinski, B.

  • Author_Institution
    Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
  • fYear
    1982
  • fDate
    8-10 Dec. 1982
  • Firstpage
    659
  • Lastpage
    663
  • Abstract
    The credibility of threats and the rationality underlying their execution is studied in the context of a Stackelberg game with the reversed information structure, repeated an infinite number of times.
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Decision and Control, 1982 21st IEEE Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Orlando, FL, USA
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CDC.1982.268223
  • Filename
    4047326
    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=49&DC=3046525