DocumentCode
3184146
Title
Second-score auction based on production possibilities set in DEA
Author
Sun Ya-hui ; Feng Yu-qiang
Author_Institution
Sch. of Manage., Harbin Inst. of Technol., Harbin, China
fYear
2011
fDate
8-10 Aug. 2011
Firstpage
3333
Lastpage
3336
Abstract
In multi-attribute auctions, score auction is the most prevalent mechanism in practical application. We consider the second-score auction protocol because of its properties of incentive compatibility and individual rationality. In the paper, we use the theory of production possibilities set in DEA to analyze the second-score auction. With the DEA-based cost norms, we revise the payment rule in the second-score auction, and the analysis shows the revision will improve the buyer´s revenue at the cost of the decrease of the winner´s revenue.
Keywords
commerce; data envelopment analysis; DEA-based cost norms; buyer revenue; data envelopment analysis; incentive compatibility; multiattribute auction; payment rule; production possibilities; second-score auction; Decision making; Economics; Educational institutions; Europe; Production; Protocols; Set theory; DEA-based cost norm; data envelopment analysis (DEA); multi-attribute auction; second-score auction;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Artificial Intelligence, Management Science and Electronic Commerce (AIMSEC), 2011 2nd International Conference on
Conference_Location
Deng Leng
Print_ISBN
978-1-4577-0535-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/AIMSEC.2011.6011141
Filename
6011141
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