Evolutionary dynamics and potential games in non-cooperative routing

Author

Altman, Eitan ; Hayel, Yezekael ; Kameda, Hisao

Author_Institution

INRIA Sophia Antipolis, Sophia Antipolis

fYear

2007

fDate

16-20 April 2007

Firstpage

1

Lastpage

5

Abstract

We consider a routing problem in a network with a general topology. Considering a link cost which is linear in the link flow, we obtain a unique Nash equilibrium and show that the non-cooperative game can be expressed as a potential game. We establish various convergence and stability properties of of the equilibrium related to the routing problem being a potential game. We then consider the routing problem in the framework of a population game and study the evolution of the size of the populations when the replicator dynamics is used.

Keywords

game theory; telecommunication network routing; telecommunication network topology; Nash equilibrium; evolutionary dynamics; network routing problem; network topology; noncooperative game; noncooperative routing; potential games; stability property; Cities and towns; Context modeling; Convergence; Cost function; Nash equilibrium; Network topology; Roads; Routing; Telecommunication traffic; Traffic control;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks and Workshops, 2007. WiOpt 2007. 5th International Symposium on

Conference_Location

Limassol

Print_ISBN

978-1-4244-0960-0

Electronic_ISBN

978-1-4244-0961-7

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/WIOPT.2007.4480096

Filename

4480096