• DocumentCode
    3250146
  • Title

    Why more choices cause less cooperation in iterated prisoner´s dilemma

  • Author

    Darwen, Paul J. ; Yao, Xin

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Comput. Sci. & Electr. Eng., Queensland Univ., Brisbane, Qld., Australia
  • Volume
    2
  • fYear
    2001
  • fDate
    2001
  • Firstpage
    987
  • Abstract
    The classic iterated prisoner´s dilemma (IPD) has only 2 choices, cooperate or defect. However, most real-world situations offer intermediate responses, between full cooperation and full defection. Previous studies observed that with intermediate levels, mutual cooperation is less likely to emerge, and even if it does it is less stable. Exactly why has been a mystery. This paper demonstrates two mechanisms that sabotage the emergence of full mutual cooperation. First, to increase cooperation requires behavioral (phenotypic) diversity to explore different possible outcomes, and once evolution has converged somewhat on a particular degree of cooperation, it is unlikely to shift. Secondly, more choices allows a richer choice of stable strategies that are not simply cooperating with each other to exclude an invader, but which are symbiotic. Such non-symmetric and symbiotic players in the space of strategies act as roadblocks on the path to full cooperation
  • Keywords
    evolutionary computation; game theory; behavioral diversity; evolutionary computation; game theory; iterated prisoner dilemma; mutual cooperation; Artificial intelligence; Biology; Computer science; Evolution (biology); History; Scheduling algorithm; Sorting; Symbiosis;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Evolutionary Computation, 2001. Proceedings of the 2001 Congress on
  • Conference_Location
    Seoul
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7803-6657-3
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CEC.2001.934298
  • Filename
    934298