• DocumentCode
    3416189
  • Title

    Energy efficiency in multi-hop CDMA networks: A game theoretic analysis considering operating costs

  • Author

    Betz, Sharon ; Poor, H. Vincent

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Electr. Eng., Princeton Univ., Princeton, NJ
  • fYear
    2008
  • fDate
    March 31 2008-April 4 2008
  • Firstpage
    2781
  • Lastpage
    2784
  • Abstract
    A game-theoretic analysis is used to study the effects of receiver choice and transmit power on the energy efficiency of multi-hop networks in which the nodes communicate using direct-sequence code division multiple access (DS-CDMA). A Nash equilibrium of the game in which the network nodes can choose their receivers as well as their transmit powers to maximize the total number of bits they transmit per unit of energy spent (including both transmit and operating energy) is derived. The energy efficiencies resulting from the use of different linear multiuser receivers in this context are compared for the non-cooperative game. Significant gains in energy efficiency are observed when multiuser receivers, particularly the linear minimum mean-square error (MMSE) receiver, are used instead of conventional matched filter receivers.
  • Keywords
    code division multiple access; decision theory; game theory; mean square error methods; radio receivers; spread spectrum communication; MMSE receiver; Nash equilibrium; direct-sequence code division multiple access; energy efficient communication; game theoretic analysis; linear multiuser receivers; multihop CDMA networks; operating costs; receiver choice; transmit power; Context; Cost function; Energy efficiency; Game theory; Intelligent networks; Multiaccess communication; Nash equilibrium; Pricing; Routing protocols; Spread spectrum communication; Code division multiaccess; Communication systems; Game theory;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, 2008. ICASSP 2008. IEEE International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Las Vegas, NV
  • ISSN
    1520-6149
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-1483-3
  • Electronic_ISBN
    1520-6149
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICASSP.2008.4518226
  • Filename
    4518226