Research on Strategic Behavior of Real Estate Firms Based on Option Game Under Asymmetric Competition Interaction

This paper illustrates the use of real options valuation and game theory principles to analyze strategic behavior of the real estate firms under asymmetric competition interaction. Symmetrical option game model assumes the leader and the follower share market equally. So the demands and profits flow are equal for competitors. In fact, due to the competitive advantages and negative externality, the interaction between competitors is unequal. That is to say, the competitors won´t share markets equally under asymmetric competition interaction. It brings the leaders positive or negative effects. In order to analyze the asymmetrical competition interaction, this paper introduces a demand coefficient to change the demands when the real estate firm preempting. It makes the demands and profits flow unequal. Then we discuss its effect on the threshold and option value of leaders and followers. From the numerical analysis, we can see, to real estate firms, the more competitive advantages the firm has, the earlier it will invest. It also brings more negative externalities and lowers the follower´s investment threshold.