Optimal Solutions for the Venezuelan Unit Commitment Hydrothermal System

This work is about different optimal solutions for the unit commitment problem in the Venezuelan hydrothermal power system, disregarding the transmission system. The centralized cost-based maximum net social benefit solution, the oligopoly solution and the unregulated monopoly solution are formulated and analyzed. The oligopoly is studied via Nash-Cournot equilibrium, obtained iteratively considering both price-maker and price-taker firms. The price-demand curves are created using a price-demand elasticity parameter. The hydro plants can be of the run-of-river type or can have a regulation period, like in the case of Guri. In latter case the future profit is represented by a fixed volume of water to be turbined in the day ahead. Since integer variable are necessary to simulate the shut-down, start-up process a mixed integer commercial programming application is employed