Counterintelligence and Security: Systemic Weaknesses in the U.S. Approach

Despite the considerable efforts made by the United States to protect its national security information from exposure to hostile intelligence-gathering, there continue to be too many cases where such information--some of it of great consequence to the U. S.--is lost. Espionage--of either the technical or human variety--will never be eradicated. The most one can expect is to minimize those cases where serious losses can occur without detection, particularly over long periods of time. U. S. efforts in the traditional counter-intelligence area--identifying and controlling hostile intelligence agents within the United States--have made substantial progress in recent years, far outpacing the progress on the security or defensive side. This is due in large part ot the cohesion within the Government of those activities involved in this particular type of activity. On the security side, however, there is a lack of such cohesion, either in terms of relating security disciplines as a whole; or in terms of relating activities undertaken within a particular discipline (e.g., personnel security); or in terms of relating one security discipline to another. U. S. counter-intelligence and security programs will never be as effective as they might be until these systemic problems are addressed.