DocumentCode
518749
Title
Notice of Retraction
Evolutionary game analysis on management of knowledge employee
Author
Haishu Lu ; Li You ; Lin Tang ; Yunqing Yu
Author_Institution
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Jiangsu Teachers Univ. of Technol., Changzhou, China
Volume
4
fYear
2010
fDate
27-29 March 2010
Firstpage
351
Lastpage
354
Abstract
Notice of Retraction
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
At present, by using qualitative methods, many scholars studied their motivation mechanisms and analyzed their motivation factor and processes from the perspective of behavior and psychology, but attempts to consider the interaction among the knowledge employees, between the knowledge employees and the enterprises have been very few. So, this paper establishes two evolutionary game models for studying motivation mechanisms of the knowledge employees under the assumptions that the enterprises and the knowledge employees all have bounded rationality. By using replicator dynamics equations, this paper analyses the strategy choice on the interaction between the knowledge employees and the enterprises, among the knowledge employees, and furthermore, discusses the evolutionary stability strategies of the knowledge employees and the enterprises.
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
At present, by using qualitative methods, many scholars studied their motivation mechanisms and analyzed their motivation factor and processes from the perspective of behavior and psychology, but attempts to consider the interaction among the knowledge employees, between the knowledge employees and the enterprises have been very few. So, this paper establishes two evolutionary game models for studying motivation mechanisms of the knowledge employees under the assumptions that the enterprises and the knowledge employees all have bounded rationality. By using replicator dynamics equations, this paper analyses the strategy choice on the interaction between the knowledge employees and the enterprises, among the knowledge employees, and furthermore, discusses the evolutionary stability strategies of the knowledge employees and the enterprises.
Keywords
evolutionary computation; game theory; human resource management; knowledge management; personnel; psychology; behavior perspective; evolutionary game analysis; evolutionary stability strategies; knowledge employee management; knowledge employees; motivation factor; motivation mechanism; psychology perspective; qualitative method; replicator dynamics equations; Costs; Employee welfare; Equations; Humans; Knowledge management; Psychology; Resource management; Stability analysis; Technological innovation; Technology management; evolutionary game; knowledge employees; motivation mechanism; replicator dynamics equations;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Advanced Computer Control (ICACC), 2010 2nd International Conference on
Conference_Location
Shenyang
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-5845-5
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICACC.2010.5486906
Filename
5486906
Link To Document