DocumentCode
619886
Title
Equivalence between sethi advertising model and a scalar LQ differential game
Author
Zhang Rong ; Ren Qingzhong
Author_Institution
Sch. of Econ. & Bus. Adm., Chongqing Univ., Chongqing, China
fYear
2013
fDate
25-27 May 2013
Firstpage
1244
Lastpage
1247
Abstract
It is proven in this paper that, under certain conditions, the closed-loop Nash equilibrium of the Sethi advertising model is equivalent to that of a standard scalar LQ differential game. By this way, some properties of the advertising duopoly model, such as the existence and uniqueness of the closed-loop Nash equilibrium, can be analyzed more deeply based on the existing result of an LQ differential game.
Keywords
advertising; closed loop systems; differential games; Sethi advertising model; advertising duopoly model; closed-loop Nash equilibrium; scalar LQ differential game; Advertising; Analytical models; Economics; Equations; Games; Mathematical model; Nash equilibrium; Riccati equation; Sethi advertising model; closed-loop Nash equilibrium; scalar LQ differential game;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Control and Decision Conference (CCDC), 2013 25th Chinese
Conference_Location
Guiyang
Print_ISBN
978-1-4673-5533-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CCDC.2013.6561115
Filename
6561115
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