Constraint conditions to eliminate AS incentive of lying in interdomain routing

Autonomous Systems(ASes) discover routing paths to the destination AS via BGP announcements advertised by neighbor ASes in interdomain routing. However, the actual packets forwarding paths of ASes may be inconsistent with their announced routing paths. Lying about data routing path is the main cause of path inconsistency. Prior work on this issue could not stop ASes announcing non-best routing path. This paper search for constraint conditions on routing policy to make the single AS have no incentive to unilaterally lie about its actual routing path, if the other ASes in the network honestly advertise their actual routing paths. We model routing policy with AS business relationships and propose AS revenue function to quantify AS incentive. Relying on traffic attraction models, we propose the constraint conditions. We demonstrate, both theoretically and experimentally, that the conditions could eliminate AS incentive of lying completely.