Revealing Cascading Failure Vulnerability in Power Grids Using Risk-Graph

Security issues related to power grid networks have attracted the attention of researchers in many fields. Recently, a new network model that combines complex network theories with power flow models was proposed. This model, referred to as the extended model, is suitable for investigating vulnerabilities in power grid networks. In this paper, we study cascading failures of power grids under the extended model. Particularly, we discover that attack strategies that select target nodes (TNs) based on load and degree do not yield the strongest attacks. Instead, we propose a novel metric, called the risk graph, and develop novel attack strategies that are much stronger than the load-based and degree-based attack strategies. The proposed approaches and the comparison approaches are tested on IEEE 57 and 118 bus systems and Polish transmission system. The results demonstrate that the proposed approaches can reveal the power grid vulnerability in terms of causing cascading failures more effectively than the comparison approaches.