Equilibrium threshold strategy in observable queueing systems in cognitive radio networks

We study the equilibrium threshold balking strategy of secondary users (SUs) in the observable queueing system with server interruptions in the cognitive radio networks (CRNs). The SU packets or connections are treated as customers and the primary user (PU) channel as the server. And the emergence of PU causes the licensed channel temporarily unavailable for SUs. The action is like an interruption to the server. Each secondary customer wanting to optimize its benefit needs to make a choice between entering the spectrum and balking. In our model, we consider an infrastructure-based CRN where SUs can get the information on the number of SUs in the queue and the spectrum state before entering. A pure threshold strategy is adopted to maximize the individual welfare. If the number of SUs waiting in the queue does not exceed the threshold, the tagged SU joins the queue; otherwise leaves. We also investigate the corresponding social benefit when all SUs obey the threshold strategy.