Demand information disclosure in competing supply chains with additional service warrant

This paper investigates the effects of retailers´ information disclosing decision and manufacturer´s acceptation or rejection on the additional service warrant provided by manufacturer in a supply chain with one manufacturer and two Cournot competing retailers who are endowed with some private demand information from the common market. A liner inverse demand function is assumed, and three scenarios (No Disclosing, All Disclosing, and Only One Disclosing) are considered. The paper studies the retailers´ strategies and the manufacturer´s optimal strategy based on retailers´. The results show that the profits of all members are influenced by several factors: the initial base demand for product, which indicate the retailer´s power structure is symmetric or asymmetric; the competition intensity; the coefficient of service cost, which affects the manufacturer´s and retailers´ decision directly; and the volatility and accuracy of the information. And we consider that how these parameters change to make retailers reach equilibrium or a Prisoner´s dilemma in the first stage of the game, and how the results and parameters changing affect the manufacturer´s strategy of accepting information disclosure or not.