• DocumentCode
    822970
  • Title

    Secure Bit: Transparent, Hardware Buffer-Overflow Protection

  • Author

    Piromsopa, Krerk ; Enbody, Richard J.

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Comput. Sci. & Eng., Michigan State Univ.
  • Volume
    3
  • Issue
    4
  • fYear
    2006
  • Firstpage
    365
  • Lastpage
    376
  • Abstract
    We propose a minimalist, architectural approach, Secure Bit (patent pending), to protect against buffer overflow attacks on control data (return-address and function-pointer attacks in particular). Secure Bit provides a hardware bit to protect the integrity of addresses for the purpose of preventing such buffer-overflow attacks. Secure Bit is transparent to user software: it provides backward compatibility with legacy user code. It can detect and prevent all address-corrupting buffer-overflow attacks with little runtime performance penalty. Addresses passed in buffers between processes are marked insecure, and control instructions using those addresses as targets will raise an exception. An important differentiating aspect of our protocol is that, once an address has been marked as insecure, there is no instruction to remark it as secure. Robustness and transparency are demonstrated by emulating the hardware, booting Linux on the emulator, running application software on that Linux, and performing known attacks
  • Keywords
    Linux; buffer storage; protocols; security of data; Linux; Secure Bit; control data; hardware buffer-overflow protection; invasive software; legacy user code; protocol; robustness; Application software; Buffer overflow; Costs; Hardware; Kernel; Linux; Protection; Protocols; Robustness; Runtime; Buffer overflow; invasive software; security and protection.; security kernels;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Journal_Title
    Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE Transactions on
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • ISSN
    1545-5971
  • Type

    jour

  • DOI
    10.1109/TDSC.2006.56
  • Filename
    4012648