نقد ديدگاه آنتوني فلو در باب معناداري گزاره هاي ديني

A Critique on Anthony Flewʹs View on Meaningfulness of Religious Propositions

Meaningfulness of religious propositions has been questioned by August Comte, sociologist, in the recent decades and has been intensified with severe support and predilection of Anthony Flew, Popperʹs disciple. By accepting falsifiability principle of Popper, that Popper himself had planned it for differentiate experimental science from pseudoscience against logical positivism, and by connecting that with meaningfulness, Flew structured a pattern and criterion for meaningfulness of experimental and other propositions, including religious propositions. By believing in experimental abolitionary of meaning principle and by accepting presumption of devout, that ((religious propositions do exist)), Flew concluded that only experimental propositions are capable of being abolished experimentally and despite the fact that religious propositions are existing rules according to devout, they are not meaningful, because they can not be abolished experimentally. Therefore Flew believes in meaninglessness and absurdity of religious propositions, because of lack of experimental evidences regarding their abolition, so he regarded all religious propositions uninformative and unabolishable (elimintivisim). In this paper, we try to show the structural methodological weakness of reductionism, exclusiveness, and empirical dogmatism by a critical review of Flewʹs theory. And we also try to pursue the idleness and baselessnes of his hypothesis on religious propositions.