نگهداشت وجه نقد، ارزش شركت و عدم تقارن اطلاعاتي

هدف اصلي تحقيق بررسي رابطه بين نگهداشت وجه نقد و ارزش شركت در وضعيت عدم تقارن اطلاعاتي است. جامعه آماري تحقيق، تمام شركتهاي پذيرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران هستند. تعداد 105 شركت به عنوان نمونه‌ انتخاب شده‌اند كه طي دوره‌ زماني 1382 تا 1387 مورد بررسي قرار گرفته‌اند. از روش تجزيه ‌و ‌تحليل پانل و رگرسيون حداقل مربعات ادغامي به منظور آزمون فرضيه ها و تخمين ضرايب استفاده گرديد. نتايج تحقيق حاكي است كه در وضعيت عدم تقارن اطلاعاتي بين نگهداشت وجه نقد و ارزش شركت رابطه معكوس معناداري هست. يافته‌ها مويد نظريه جريان نقدي آزاد است.

This study examines two conflicting hypotheses. First, based on Myers and Majluf (1984), cash holdings in combination with a higher level of information asymmetry have a positive influence on firm value because the adverse selection costs arising from external finance can be avoided. Second, Jensenʹs free cash flow theory coupled with a higher level of information asymmetry leads to extreme moral hazard. Instead of paying out the free cash flow to shareholders, managers tend to waste these funds on inefficient investments or on their own pet projects. This study examines the relationship between cash holdings and firm value under information asymmetry assumption. The sample data consists of financial reports of the companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). The data is selected from 105 companies from 1382-1387, using panel data and Least Squares method for coefficients estimation and hypotheses testing. The results show that there is a significant and negative relationship between cash holdings and firm value, holding information asymmetry assumption. The results indicate that agency costs based on the theory of free cash flow outweigh the benefits of financial slack in mitigating adverse selection costs when raising external funds.