SOME FRIENDLY MOLINIST AMENDMENTS

Attempting to reconcile a robust sense of human freedom with entrenched Church doctrines, Luis de Molina espoused for the first time a complete formulation of the doctrine of divine middle knowledge. However, it immediately sparked vigorous theological and philosophical debate. The debate has been revived, with Robert Adams as the original leading opponent. Adamsʹs objection is that the doctrine cannot be true since its (alleged) prepositional objects lack the requisite metaphysical grounds for their being true. Breaking with many contemporary Molinists, I offer reasons for rejecting popular counterfactual semantics as a means to assess "conditionals of freedom." I then discuss an alternative way to assess "conditionals of freedom" inspired by Suarez and revived by Richard Gaskin, anticipate an objection to it and argue that it is not as damaging as it first seems. I conclude that a Molinist can respond to Adams-type objections without relying upon popular semantics.