Title of article :
Development of stochastic dynamic Nash game model for reservoir operation. I. The symmetric stochastic model with perfect information
Author/Authors :
Arman Ganji، نويسنده , , Davar Khalili، نويسنده , , Mohammad Karamouz، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2007
Abstract :
Increasing water demands, higher standards of living, depletion of resources of acceptable quality and excessive water pollution due to agricultural and industrial expansions have caused intense social and political predicaments, and conflicting issues among water consumers. The available techniques commonly used in reservoir optimization/operation do not consider interaction, behavior and preferences of water users, reservoir operator and their associated modeling procedures, within the stochastic modeling framework. In this paper, game theory is used to present the associated conflicts among different consumers due to limited water. Considering the game theory fundamentals, the Stochastic Dynamic Nash Game with perfect information (PSDNG) model is developed, which assumes that the decision maker has sufficient (perfect) information regarding the associated randomness of reservoir operation parameters. The simulated annealing approach (SA) is applied as a part of the proposed stochastic framework, which makes the PSDNG solution conceivable. As a case study, the proposed model is applied to the Zayandeh-Rud river basin in Iran with conflicting demands. The results are compared with alternative reservoir operation models, i.e., Bayesian stochastic dynamic programming (BSDP), sequential genetic algorithm (SGA) and classical dynamic programming regression (DPR). Results show that the proposed model has the ability to generate reservoir operating policies, considering interactions of water users, reservoir operator and their preferences.
Keywords :
Stochastic dynamic game , Conflict analysis , Reservoir operation , Game theory
Journal title :
Advances in Water Resources
Journal title :
Advances in Water Resources