• Title of article

    Simulating digital dividend auctions: Service neutrality versus dedicated licences

  • Author/Authors

    Jose Luis GOMEZ-BARROSO، نويسنده , , ASUNCION MOCHON، نويسنده , , AND YAGO SAEZ، نويسنده , , Claudio Feij?o، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2012
  • Pages
    15
  • From page
    11
  • To page
    25
  • Abstract
    The award of the digital dividend can consolidate auctions as the preferred mechanism for spectrum allocation. Knowing in advance an estimate of what the results of an auction with these characteristics could be would be unquestionably useful for those in charge of designing the process, even if at the end another method such as a beauty contest is chosen. This article provides a simulation of a digital dividend auction in a major-type European country. In one of the scenarios, the spectrum is not pre-allocated to any service in particular (service neutrality) while in the remaining four, blocks of spectrum are pre-allocated to DTT, mobile multimedia and mobile broadband communications. The results of the simulations reveal that the service neutrality scenario maximizes revenues for the seller and that, in general, DTT operators would seem to have fewer opportunities as the spectrum packaging is less protective for them.
  • Keywords
    Auctions , Mobile communications , Television , Scarce resources , Digital dividend , Spectrum management
  • Journal title
    Telematics and Informatics
  • Serial Year
    2012
  • Journal title
    Telematics and Informatics
  • Record number

    1285877