مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رساني علوم و فناوري - The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard, or Capital Market Imperfections?

Title of article :

The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard, or Capital Market Imperfections?

Author/Authors :

Daniel A. Ackerberg، نويسنده , , Maristella Botticini، نويسنده ,

Issue Information :

فصلنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2000

Pages :

From page :

241

To page :

257

Keywords :

Moral hazard , Tuscany , agrarian contracts , MEDIEVAL , Risk sharing , earlyRenaissance.

Journal title :

Explorations in Economic History

Serial Year :

2000

Journal title :

Explorations in Economic History

Record number :

146086

Link To Document :