مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رساني علوم و فناوري - Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist

Title of article :

Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist

Author/Authors :

Alejandro M. Manelli، نويسنده , , Daniel R. Vincent، نويسنده ,

Issue Information :

دوماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2006

Pages :

From page :

To page :

Keywords :

monopoly pricing , Price discrimination , Multi-dimensional mechanism design , Incentivecompatibility , Adverse selection , Auctions

Journal title :

Journal of Economic Theory

Serial Year :

2006

Journal title :

Journal of Economic Theory

Record number :

147496

Link To Document :