Cheating Signals

Despite attempts to divorce the two, "cheating" should be considered a subset of "signals". To evaluate the roles of both cheating and information in communication, this paper defines signals as traits that impose on their bearers a trade-off between costs on their fitness and benefits via the response of other individuals (a more precise definition is found in the text). It is argued that this response results from a change in the recipientsʹ information. Consequently, reliable signals improve recipientsʹ choice of actions, whereas cheating signals worsens recipientsʹ choice of actions. ication systems are divided into choice-based, co-operative, and cue-reading. Cheating signals that may be found in choice-based systems are bluffs, attenuators, purely attractive or repellent signals, mimicry and camouflage, lies may be found in co-operative communication systems, deceptions in cue-reading systems. A commonly discussed category, namely "conventional signals", seems to refer, in fact, to several distinct evolutionary mechanisms. Another conclusion of this analysis is that sweeping statements on the relative role of cheating in communication are largely irrelevant and misleading.