The Physicistʹs Road to Theoretical Biology and the Mind-Matter Problem

Basic features of a physical-scientific approach for describing intricate biological behaviour such as the mind-matter problem are discussed. The emphasis is put on the fact that we describe Nature by a hierarchic structure where concepts are well defined at their proper level but where we must accept that these concepts have a limited scope. This makes it possible to have "emergent" features at higher levels which do not necessarily have any relevance at lower levels. Reductionism and the distinction between "predictability" and "strict determinism" is considered from that aspect. Questions of whether classical mechanics is inadequate for describing living systems or if quantum mechanics is necessary and more appropriate are discussed. It is argued that "classical mechanics" seen in the scope of the paper provides the most appropriate framework in this context, and that any conflicting view is based upon basic misunderstandings. Finally, some aspects of learning, thinking and consciousness are discussed, and it is emphasized that these must be regarded from a biological-evolutionary point of view.