Author/Authors :
Fishman، نويسنده , , Michael A.، نويسنده ,
Abstract :
When detecting a predator, some prey animals respond in a counterintuitive fashion by approaching, rather than fleeing, that potential threat of extinction. This seemingly paradoxical behaviour, known aspredator inspection, has been reported for a wide variety of taxa—and therefore can be assumed to be adaptive. However, the view of predator inspection as a paradoxical behaviour rests on two implicit assumptions: (a) initial predator detecting is unambiguous, with no uncertainty in discriminating between hunting and non hunting members of predator species, or members of predator species and unrelated phenomena; (b) the costs of flight are negligible relative to the risk of predation. Upon reflection assumption (a) is not really tenable. Whereas assumption (b) is not consistent with experimental evidence [Godin & Crossman (1994)Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol.34,359–366]. Given that predator detection is ambiguous and the costs of flight are not negligible, a prey individual may benefit by a closer approach to the source of the alarming signals, thus improving its assessment of the situation—despite the increased risk of predation. In this paper, the above statement is given rigor by reformulating the problem in game theoretical terms. The results indicate that a prey will minimize its costs by performing predator inspection whenever its degree of certainty regarding predator identification and/or assessment of its intentions is less than a threshold, which is determined by the modelʹs parameters.