مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رساني علوم و فناوري - 093035 (M32) Optimal incentive contracting with ex ante and ex post moral hazards: Theory and evidence : Puelz R., Snow A., Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Volume 14, Number 2, 1997, 169

Title of article :

093035 (M32) Optimal incentive contracting with ex ante and ex post moral hazards: Theory and evidence : Puelz R., Snow A., Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Volume 14, Number 2, 1997, 169–188

Issue Information :

روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 1997

Pages :

From page :

264

To page :

264

Journal title :

Insurance Mathematics and Economics

Serial Year :

1997

Journal title :

Insurance Mathematics and Economics

Record number :

1541709

Link To Document :

https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=10&DC=1541709