Title of article
Neo-classical economics, institutional economics and improved fisheries management
Author/Authors
van der Burg، نويسنده , , Tsjalle van den Burg، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
دوماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2000
Pages
7
From page
45
To page
51
Abstract
According to neo-classical economists, taxes and individual transferable quotas (ITQs) are the most efficient measures for dealing with the problem of overfishing. Institutional economists, however, criticise neo-classical economists for neglecting political problems, enforcement problems and transaction costs. In relation to this, they argue that taxes and ITQs have serious weaknesses as well. Taking account of both neo-classical and institutional arguments, a new management system is proposed. The system is as efficient in the neo-classical sense as taxes and ITQs, but it also has certain advantages in view of institutional aspects.
Keywords
fishery management , institutional economics , enforcement , Transaction Costs , Political problems
Journal title
Marine Policy
Serial Year
2000
Journal title
Marine Policy
Record number
1586640
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