Title of article :
Resisting economic integration when industry location is uncertain
Author/Authors :
Gallo، نويسنده , , Fredrik، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2010
Pages :
16
From page :
467
To page :
482
Abstract :
This paper analyses the political determination of transportation costs in a new economic geography model. In a benchmark case with certainty about where agglomeration takes place, a majority of voters favour economic integration and the resulting equilibrium is an industrialised core and a de-industrialised periphery. Allowing for uncertainty, a high level of trade costs may win the election and maintain the initial distribution of industry. The reason is that a coalition of risk-averse immobile factors of production votes for the status quo due to uncertainty about which region will attract industry if economic integration is pursued. Finally, the standard view that agglomeration is unambiguously beneficial to residents in the industrial centre is challenged by introducing costs of undertaking economic integration.
Keywords :
Footloose entrepreneur model , Majority voting , New economic geography , Regional policy
Journal title :
European Economic Review
Serial Year :
2010
Journal title :
European Economic Review
Record number :
1798345
Link To Document :
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