Title of article :
Asymmetric treatment of identical agents in teams
Author/Authors :
Bose، نويسنده , , Arup and Pal، نويسنده , , Debashis and Sappington، نويسنده , , David E.M. Sappington، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2010
Abstract :
We investigate when identical agents will be treated asymmetrically in a simple team setting. Asymmetric treatment is optimal when the agents’ individual contributions to team performance are strategic complements. Symmetric treatment of identical agents is optimal when the agents’ contributions are strategic substitutes or when they are independent.
Keywords :
Moral hazard , Asymmetric treatment , Teams
Journal title :
European Economic Review
Journal title :
European Economic Review
